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for personnel, he recommends positioning additional equipment on the
island in case of a regional crisis. Secondly, O’Hanlon proposes that the
Navy take another look at its full-time
presence in the Mediterranean. He believes that “NATO’s southern flank and
Israel’s western flank no longer constitute strategic vulnerabilities in the
post–Cold War era.” If a threat no longer exists, eliminate carrier deployments that are carried out only to
reassure allies and give “psychological
comfort.” Reducing unnecessary deployments, shifting bases closer to contested regions, and rotating crews to the
ship instead of returning the ship to
port will decrease the operational
tempo of the sailors, eliminate the need
for two carriers, and generate savings.
The recommendations made in this
work in early 2001 could have given the
Bush administration some policy options and provided alternatives for the
2001 QDR. However, many of
O’Hanlon’s arguments have been overtaken by world events. Nevertheless,
O’Hanlon’s exhaustive research and insightful analysis make this an interesting book for readers of strategy and
force-planning decision making.
CYNTHIA PERROTTI

Lieutenant Colonel
Naval War College

Khalilzad, Zalmay, et al. The United States and
Asia: Toward a New U.S. Strategy and Force Posture. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2001. 260pp.
$20

The United States and Asia presents a
cogent analysis of U.S. strategic planning in Asia, sweeping from Japan to
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Pakistan. The study’s specific focus is
development of policy options and recommendations, looking out at an approximate twenty-year horizon into the
future, especially analyzing and noting
implications for Air Force planning. A
result of Project AIR FORCE’S work on
future asian security, this book was prepared by a team of RAND specialists,
with the help of senior U.S. Air Force
leadership, and with editorial comment
by U.S. foreign policy officials. It benefits from the strengths of the team approach without the flaws of design by
committee. It succinctly presents the
thoughts and findings of the research
group in clear, thought-provoking
prose and figures.
The brief introduction stresses the need
to prevent latent rivalries in Asia from
upsetting the twenty years of relative
peace between 1980 and 2000. The
challenge for the United States is to develop policies that will continue to promote a stable Asia compatible with U.S.
interests—in short, to succeed in a
quest for “dynamic peace.”
The scene is set with a discussion of the
range of international trends and problems in Asia, including possible Korean
unification, the U.S.-Japan relationship,
China’s emerging profile, India’s ambitions, Pakistan’s difficulties, Russia’s future, disputes in the South China Sea,
stresses on Indonesia, and Vietnam’s
significance. Although necessarily a
whirlwind tour and not for country
specialists, these are short, basically fair
synopses. Additionally, the book includes four longer appendices by area
specialists that add considerable detail
to the earlier descriptions of changing
political-military environments in
Northeast Asia, China, Southeast Asia,
and South Asia.
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Although the book discusses terrorism
and Islamic fundamentalism, the events
of the past year argue for more analysis
of these topics in any strategic discussion, especially as they relate to South,
Central, and Southeast Asia.
In the strategy section, key U.S. objectives in Asia are defined as continued
economic, political, and military access,
and the prevention of the rise of a regional power or coalition that would
prevent access to the region. Discussed
strategic options for achieving these objectives include strengthening U.S. hegemony, forming a “condominium”
with one of Asia’s major powers, acting
as a “balance” in a multipolar regional
power system, creating a comprehensive collective security system, and U.S.
disengagement. Each approach discussed is discarded as either too
expensive, too fraught with domestic
problems, too subordinate, or too ineffectual historically. The study then recommends a strategic approach that is
flexible and pragmatic, involving elements of most of these strategic options. Bilateral relationships should
push toward multilateralization, creating a larger core partnership including
the United States, Japan, South Korea,
Australia, and perhaps Singapore, the
Philippines, and Thailand. At the same
time it advocates a balance-of-power
strategy among the rising powers of
China, India, and Russia that will prevent these states from either threatening each other or “bandwagoning” to
undercut U.S. interests. It encourages
promotion of a security dialog among
all the states of Asia and encourages
others to enter the U.S.-led multilateral
framework. It suggests maintaining flexible relations with as many countries as
possible to support the formation of ad
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hoc coalitions to deal with emerging regional problems. The study goes on to
outline more than a dozen ways this
strategy could be adapted to implement
U.S. policies in Asia.
In the military section, observations are
made about U.S. force structure in Asia,
with some suggestions for reconfiguring
military presence given anticipated
changes in the Asian environment. The
study predicts that North Korea may
not require that all U.S. military forces
leave South Korea if and when Korea
unifies, so it suggests the option of
maintaining one of the two main operating air bases in Korea. The study also
recommends expanding base facilities
on Guam. Beyond that, it recommends
making arrangements to use existing
bases in Asia, both U.S. and foreign,
through diplomatic means. In this way,
the United States would remain neither
overcommitted nor undercommitted.
This section is enhanced by the inclusion of a series of schematic maps and
tables that identify and assess U.S. air
bases in Asia. The maps are especially
useful in assessing U.S. Air Force capabilities for crisis response in Korea, Taiwan, Southeast Asia, and South Asia.
An important recommendation is made
to improve the U.S. Unified Command
Plan either by including Pakistan under
the Pacific Command, as India is, or by
establishing a coordinating committee
for daily communication.
Concluding military recommendations
are for buildup of Guam as a major hub
for U.S. power projection in Asia, cooperation of the U.S. Air Force and the
Navy to maximize joint leverage, and
review of the Air Force future force
structure, looking toward longer-range
combat platforms, including heavy
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bombers, arsenal planes, and longrange, high-speed strike craft.
Concluding strategic recommendations
include maintaining open lines of communication with as many parties in
Asia as possible, maintaining U.S.
transparency so that U.S. objectives are
clearly understood, and expanding the
net of U.S. security partners.
This RAND outline of a comprehensive, realistic, flexible U.S. strategy in
Asia, with appropriate military reconfiguration, is an important contribution
to our search for continued stability in
this part of the world.
GRANT F. RHODE

Brookline, Massachusetts

Pollack, Kenneth M. The Threatening Storm: The
Case for Invading Iraq. New York: Random
House, 2002. 384pp. $25.95

The United States and its allies once
more stand on the brink of war with
Iraq. What makes this war different,
however, is that its primary goal is to
replace the dictatorial regime of
Saddam Hussein with a democratic
form of government. In the opinion of
the Bush administration, removal of
Saddam and his weapons of mass destruction will bring stability to the Middle East and the world. While there is
consensus to remove Saddam and destroy his weapons, there is disagreement among the experts as to how to
accomplish it. Kenneth Pollack is a specialist on Iraq whose experience as an
analyst for the Central Intelligence
Agency and the National Security
Council gives him a unique vantage
point from which to comment on U.S.
foreign policy in the Middle East. In
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The Threatening Storm, Pollack posits
that a U.S.-led invasion of Iraq is the
only logical means to end Saddam’s regime. This argument results from a
thorough discussion of the rise of the
current regime and of Iraq’s relationships with its neighbors and the West,
followed by a painstaking analysis of
the several options available.
In the case of Iraq, says Pollack, our vital national interest, as well as that of
the entire world, clearly lies in the economic stability of the region based on
ability to export crude oil without interference. Following the Gulf War of
1990–91, the United Nations implemented a number of measures to contain Iraqi ambitions. A short time later,
teams of weapons experts entered the
country to locate and destroy chemical
and biological weapons stockpiles and
production facilities. In 1998 Iraq threw
out the inspection teams, and for the
past four years, notes Pollack, the Iraqis
have allegedly been reacquiring chemical and biological weapons and have
reenergized their research programs to
develop nuclear weapons. Some world
leaders and strategists have proposed
five options for dealing with what they
claim is a clear and present danger to
their vital national interest in the Persian Gulf. These options are containment, deterrence, covert action, the
“Afghan” approach, and invasion.
Containment has been the policy since
the end of the Gulf War. Originally, it
had two key components: weapons inspections and economic sanctions.
With the eviction of the weapons inspectors, economic sanctions became
the sole functioning component of the
policy. The oil-for-food program and
smuggling, as well as reluctance on the
part of some allies, notably France and
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